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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES UNDER SECTION 43(a) OF THE
LANHAM ACT: YOU'VE COME A LONG WAY, BABY-
TOO FAR, MAYBE?
KENNETH B. GERMAIN"
Section 43(a)1 of the Lanham Act2 certainly has come a long way
since Judge Clark woefully remarked in 1956 that "there is indication here
and elsewhere that the bar has not yet realized the potential impact of this
statutory provision."' Indeed, as late as 1965 one commentator stated
that
so few cases have been brought under this section since its en-
actment that . . . it cannot be foreseen that any increased
utilization of this section . . . will be of substantial benefit
in helping to establish a federal law of unfair competition in the
absence of amending legislation.4
Since 1965, however, there has been so much litigation under § 43 (a)-
most of it expanding the applicability of the section-that Professor
Derenberg recently remarked that Judge Clark's statement "certainly is
no longer true."5 In particular, Professor Derenberg referred to recent
attempts to use § 43 (a) as a vehicle for consumer protection and for the
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
1. Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other
symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who shall with knowl-
edge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description or representation
cause or procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the
same to any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin
or the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes
that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or
representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
2. Trade-Mark Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, §§ 1-45, 60 Stat. 427-43, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970).
3. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 546 (2d
Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion) ; accord, Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at
the End of the First Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1029, 1039 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Derenberg, First Decade].
4. Peterson, The Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a Federal
Law of Unfair Competition, 69 DIcx. L. REv. 347, 371 (1965).
5. Derenberg, The Twenty-Fifth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 62 TRADE-MARK REP. 393, 493 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Derenberg,
Twenty-Fifth Year].
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purpose of affording federal jurisdiction over rather typical "passing-off"
cases.' He also could have mentioned the growing varieties of activities
that have been found to violate § 43(a),' and the expanded remedies
that have been considered.'
The purpose of this article is to discuss the recent growth of §
43(a) law with special reference to the relationship between the section
itself and the trademark statute in which it is housed. It is submitted that
the cases have applied § 4 3 (a) to situations it was not intended to cover
and have used it in ways that it was not designed to function.
Although legislative history will occasionally be mentioned, primary
emphasis will be placed on a careful reading of § 43 (a) and certain other
sections of the Lanham Act. This article will begin with a brief discussion
of the genesis of § 43 (a) and will be followed by an exposition of cur-
rent case law interpretations concerning jurisdiction, standing, the re-
quirements of a § 4 3 (a) action, the type of cases that fall within §
43(a), and the remedies available. The article will then deal with the
author's thesis that in certain respects § 43 (a) has already been extended
improperly, in violation of the true meaning of the statute.
ExPANSION OF § 43 (a): You'vE COME A LONG WAY, BABY
Section 43(a) is generally viewed as a reaction to the restrictive
common law action of false advertising.9 Under pre-Lanham law a com-
petitor could obtain relief against false advertising" only in limited
situations: (1) when the suit involved the classic tort of passing-off;"
(2) when a competitor was able to adequately demonstrate that his busi-
6. Id. at 492-97. For a discussion of recent case law on consumer suits under §
43 (a) see text accompanying notes 45-68 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 100-25 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 127-45 infra.
9. See Bunn, The National Law of Unfair Competition, 62 HARv. L. R V. 987, 998-
1000 (1949) ; Callmann, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort, 48 CcLTnJ. L. Rxv. 876,
885-86 (1948). See also L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651
(3d Cir. 1954).
10. Actions for trademark infringement, trade name-related unfair competition, and
disparagement (trade libel) are not generally considered within the rubric "false adver-
tising." See, e.g., E. KITcH & H. PE-LMAN, LEGAL. REGULATION OF THE COMPETITIVE
PROCESS (1972) ; S. OPPENHEIM, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES (2d ed. 1965). Both of these
casebooks treat each of the above topics separately.
11. See Am. Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). A
highly distinguished panel (Judges Taft, Lurton and Day, all of whom later became Jus-
tices of the United States Supreme Court) held that the plaintiff, who made and sold
genuine aluminum washboards, could not get an injunction against a competitor's ad-
mittedly false claims that the latter's inferior zinc washboards were made of aluminum.
Although the court found defendant's behavior "doubtless morally wrong," it concluded
that "[i]t is only where this deception induces the public to buy the goods as those of
the complainant that a private right of action arises." Id. at 285.
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ness was the "single source" of goods which were falsely advertised by
another;12 or (3) when a competitor joined with others similarly af-
fected to protest the misuse of a designation of geographical origin."
The rationale behind these rules was that suit by a competitor should be
allowed only if he could demonstrate an obvious and direct competitive
injury. In other words, the competitor was not allowed to sue as a "vicar-
ious avenger"1 of the public interest. 5 Although in 1920 Congress made
12. See Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on
other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). In this case the defendant had misrepresented its
safes as having "explosion chambers," a feature allegedly covered by a patent belonging
to the plaintiff, who had incorporated it into its safes. The Second Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Learned Hand, held that defendant's misrepresentations were enjoin-
able since even in the absence of passing-off, plaintiff was able to show that he had been
directly harmed by defendant's false claims. Judge Hand reasoned:
If a tradesman falsely foists on a customer a substitute for what the plaintiff
alone can supply, it can scarcely be that the plaintiff is without remedy, if he
can show that the customer would certainly have come to him, had the truth
been told.
Id. at 604. Thus, Judge Hand hesitantly rejected the authority of Am. Washboard Co.
v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900). The reversal of Ely-Norris by the Su-
preme Court was a result of a different view of the facts: In its view plaintiff was not
the sole manufacturer of safes having explosion chambers. 273 U.S. at 134.
A recent common law extension of the "single-source" rule occurred in Electronics
Corp. of America v. Honeywell, Inc., 428 F.2d 191 (1st Cir. 1970), where it was held
that in a duopolistic market situation an injunction would issue to prohibit a competitor
from false advertising because it was apparent that any customers unfairly attracted to
the defendant would have "nowhere to turn except to the plaintiff." Id. at 194.
13. See, e.g., Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., 127 F.2d
245 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 F. 608 (7th Cir.
1898). In Pillsbury, seven Minneapolis based flour producers sued jointly on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated to enjoin a Chicago based firm from falsely
referring to its flour as "Minneapolis" flour. Plaintiffs were able to show that flour
made in the Minneapolis area had earned a well deserved "secondary meaning" as high
quality flour. Thus, the court allowed competitors having a geographical common de-
nominator to seek joint protection of the designation of geographical origin of their
goods. Perhaps this was a limited extension of the single-source rule.
It should be noted that some doubt has been cast upon the authority of the "geo-
graphical origin" cases by the somewhat restrictive holding in California Apparel Crea-
tors v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1947). In this case, decided
under pre-Lanham law, 75 California based manufacturers of sportswear and a trade
association, suing jointly, were denied any remedy against the New York defendants'
use of the word "California" in connection with their businesses. The majority charac-
terized the case as similar to Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132
(1927). See note 12 supra. Judge Learned Hand, in dissent, would have allowed plain-
tiffs an opportunity to prove their injuries at trial. 162 F.2d at 902-03.
14. Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1925),
rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
15. No attempt will be made here to present pre-Lanham law in detail since this has
been done adequately elsewhere. See, e.g., 1 R. CAILMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR CoMPE-
TITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.1 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALL-
MANN]; 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27:1 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as McCARTHY] ; Developments in the Law--Competitive Torts, False Ad-
vertising, 77 HARv. L. REv. 888, 905 (1964). It is worth noting, however, that the pre-
Lanham common law has been heavily criticized by the commentators. See, e.g., 1 CALL-
MANN, spra, § 18.1; 2 MCCARTHY, supra, § 27:1; Handier, False and Misleading Adver-
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an abortive attempt to loosen up the common law rules,"6 it was not until
1946 that Congress acted again by passing the Lanham Act.
Early interpretations of § 43(a) were conservative. They either
restricted § 43 (a) to actions for passing-off' or confined its effect to
"include only such false descriptions or representations as are of substan-
tially the same economic nature as those which involve infringement or
other improper use of trade-marks."'
The breakthrough for § 43 (a) came in 1954 in L'Aiglon Apparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Iiw.'9 In an oft-cited" opinion, Judge Hastie em-
phatically rejected those precedents' that had construed § 43(a) as a
tising, 39 YALE L.J. 22, 34-42 (1929).
In addition, the American Law Institute rejected the rule in Am. Washboard Co. v.
Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900), and adopted a provision that arguably
even goes beyond the holding in Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603
(2d Cir. 1925), rev'd on other grounds, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). See notes 12 & 14 supra.
The ALI position is as follows:
One who diverts trade from a competitor by fraudulently representing that the
goods which he markets have ingredients or qualities which in fact they do not
have but which the goods of the competitor do have is liable to the competitor
for the harm so caused, if,
(a) when making the representation he intends that it should, or knows or
should know that it is likely to, divert trade from the competitor; and
(b) the competitor is not marketing his goods with material fraudulent
misrepresentations about them.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761 (1939).
16. Trademark Act of 1920, ch. 104, §§ 1-9, 41 Stat. 533-35.
Section 3 of the Trademark Act of 1920 provided that "any person who . . .
willfully and with intent to deceive" used a false designation or origin would be liable.
Id. § 3, 41 Stat. 534 (emphasis added). However, "[tihe limitation contained in the pro-
vision . . . practically destroyed its purpose." D. ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK
MANuAL 184 (1947) [hereinafter cited as ROBERT]. See Derenberg, First Decade, supra
note 3, at 1038.
17. [W]e do not think [§ 43(a)] changes the fundamental requirements neces-
sary to sustain a suit for unfair competition, one such requirement being a direct
injury to the property rights of a complainant by passing off the particular goods
or services misrepresented as those of the complainant. Deceiving the public by
fraudulent means, while an important factor in such a suit, does not give the
right of action unless it results in the sale of the goods as those of the com-
plainant.
Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951) (emphasis
added).
18. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass.
1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950), critiized, Derenberg, First Decade,
stepra note 3, at 1042.
19. L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). In
this case, defendant was enjoined from using a photograph of plaintiff's distinctively
designed high quality dress, which sold for $17.95, in its advertising of its own dissimilar
and inferior dress which sold for $6.95.
20. See, e.g., 1 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 18.2(b) ; 2 McCARTHY, Sftpra note 15,§ 27:4(A), at 248; Derenberg, The Seventh Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 44 TRADE-MARK REP. 991, 1053-54 (1954).
21. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
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mere codification of pre-Lanham common law. 2 He concluded:
It seems to us that Congress has defined a statutory civil wrong
of false representation of goods in commerce and has given a
broad class of suitors injured or likely to be injured by such
wrong the right to relief in the federal courts. This statutory
tort is defined in language which differentiates in it some
particulars from similar wrongs which have developed and have
become defined in the judge-made law of unfair competi-
tion .. . But however similar to or different from preexisting
law, here is a provision of a federal statute which, with clarity
and precision adequate for judicial administration, creates and
defines rights and duties and provides for their vindication in
the federal courts.2
Under the influence of L'Aiglon, the barriers to an expansive view
of § 43(a) fell quickly. For example, one court soon declared that
"[s]ection 43(a) does create a federal statutory tort, sui generis."24
The same court also stated that passing-off was not required and that a
plaintiff "need not establish a veritable monopoly position in the indus-
try."25 Such opinions sounded the death knell for the "single-source"
rule,26 and signaled the birth of a new federal law of unfair competiton."
Jurisdiction
Section 43(a) applies to two kinds of "persons :"
[1] Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in
22. 214 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.), adf'd .ub nora. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956).
25. Id.
26. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 27:4(A), at 248.
27. See Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1972) ;
Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405, 409 (6th Cir. 1963);
Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Am. Rolex
Watch Corp. v. Jack Laufer & Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
Under the influence of modern interpretations of § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(1970), the American Law Institute has proposed a rule that is much more liberal than
its predecessor. Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 761 (1939), quoted, note 15 supra,
wuith RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963), which states in
pertinent part:
One falsely markets goods or services . . . if, in the marketing process, he
makes any material false representation which is likely to induce persons to pur-
chase, to the commercial detriment of another, the goods or services which he
markets.
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connection with any goods or services, or any container or con-
tainers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or other symbols
tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall
cause such goods or services to enter into commerce; and [2]
any person who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such
designation of origin or description or representation cause or
procure the same to be transported or used in commerce or
deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or used."
The broad definitions of the Act,29 together with the very wide-
ranging language of the "intent" paragraph," have led most courts to
very liberal interpretations of the scope of jurisdiction under § 43 (a).
Indeed, it is now well settled that the early cases which required that de-
fendant's goods or services either have actually crossed state lines8 or
have had some direct and substantial connection with interstate com-
merce?' have now been discarded in favor of cases that sanction jurisdic-
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970). The second type of situation could aptly be re-
ferred to as a contributory violation. A similar provision is found in the Lanham Act's
basic infringement section. See id. § 1114(1) (b). It is reminiscent of the doctrine of
"contributory infringement" under the copyright laws. See 2 M. NIzM R, NIMUME ON
COPYRIGHT § 134 (1972).
29. The word "person" is defined in § 45 of the Lanham Act to include natural
persons and all types of legal entities including "a firm, corporation, union, association,
or other organization capable of suing or being sued in a court of law." 15 U.S.C. §
1127 (1970).
The word "commerce" means "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by
Congress." Id. Compare this definition with the term "use in commerce:"
For the purposes of this Act a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce
(a) on goods when it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers
or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto and
the goods are sold or transported in commerce and (b) on services when it is
used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are ren-
dered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in this
and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in com-
merce in connection therewith.
Id.
30. The full text of this paragraph reads:
The intent of this Act is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress
by making actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such com-
merce; to protect registered marks used in such commerce from interference by
State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons engaged in such commerce
against unfair competition; to prevent fraud and deception in such commerce
by the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable imitations of regis-
tered marks; and to provide rights and remedies stipulated by treaties and con-
ventions respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair competition entered in-
to between the United States and foreign nations.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d
Cir. 1958).
32. See In re Bookbinder's Restaurant, Inc., 240 F.2d 365, 367 (C.C.P.A. 1957). In
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tion over acts which are purely intrastate except for their effects on inter-
state commerce.3 This, of course, was to be expected a. a by-product of
the far-reaching United States Supreme Court decisions in the 1964
civil rights cases3 4 which very broadly interpreted Congress' power over
interstate commerce."3 It is also consistent with Congress' intention to
extend the Lanham Act's protection to the fullest extent possible.36
A second aspect of jurisdiction involves subject matter jurisdiction.
Although § 43(a) says only that a violator "shall be liable to a civil
action,"3 " some courts have based jurisdiction directly on that section.8"
Other courts 9 have based jurisdiction on § § 43 (a) and 39 jointly, since
the latter section expressly confers federal jurisdiction in "all actions
arising under this act, without regard to the amount in controversy or
refusing to register a service mark used by the applicant on his single restaurant in
Philadelphia the court said:
Generally speaking, only intrastate commerce which is necessary to the produc-
tion or movement of goods in interstate commerce, or which serves materially
to hamper or impede such commerce has been held to be subject to such regu-
lation.
Id.
33. Pic Design Corp. v. Bearings Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1971)
Harrison Services, Inc. v. Margino, 291 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Iding v. Anas-
ton, 266 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1967) ; Burger King, Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp.
293 (W.D. Tenn. 1965). Note, The Federal Law of Unfair Competition, 47 VA. L. REv.
600, 619-20 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Unfair Competition]. In Burger King defend-
ants sold "Whopper Burgers" in their "Whopper Drive-In" located in Memphis, Ten-
nessee; their advertising extended into neighboring parts of Arkansas. Plaintiff was
the owner of the well-known interstate franchise operation based in Florida. The court
held, that even aside from the interstate advertising done by the defendant, defendant
was engaged in "commerce:"
[U]se of this trademark and trade name has had or will have a substantial eco-
nomic effect on [plaintiff] which admittedly uses its trademark and service
marks in interstate commerce. . . . A purely intrastate business is in interstate
commerce for purposes ol § 43(a) . . . if it has a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.
Id. at 297-98 (emphasis added). Similarly, Judge Clark of the Second Circuit stated:
Since commerce itself means all commerce which Congress may lawfully regu-
late, and the legislative intent is . . . to protect persons engaged therein against
unfair competition, it would follow that a use to the injury of marks which are
in commerce is a use in commerce.
Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doc's Beverages, Inc., 193 F.2d 77, 82 n.9 (2d Cir. 1951).
34. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; Katzen-
bach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). In Katzenbach, the Court held that a restaurant
that served interstate travelers or served food a substantial portion of which has moved
in interstate commerce was engaged in "commerce" in the constitutional sense. Id. at
300-05.
35. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 1 3.
36. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
37. See note 1 supra.
38. See, e.g., Potato Chip Institute v. General Mills, Inc., 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir.
1972); Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969);
Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963).
39. See, e.g., Alum-A-Fold Shutter Corp. v. Folding Shutter Corp., 441 F.2d 556
(5th Cir. 1971); Bogene Inc. v. Whet-Mor Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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to diversity or lack of diversity of the citizenship of the parties."4 Still
other courts4' have referred to § 133 8(a) of the Judicial Code which
gives the federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action
arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety pro-
tection, copyrights and trade-marks."42 In this connection, it has been
held that an action for violation of § 43 (a) falls within § 1338(a) even
if no trademark as such is involved.43 Similarly, jurisdiction can be based
on Lanham Act § 39 even though no federally registered trademark is
involved.44
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970).
41. Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
modified, 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1972) (Lanham Act §§ 39 and 43(a) also cited) ; Scotch
Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (Lanham
Act § 39 also cited) ; Midwest Packaging Materials Co. v. Midwest Packaging Corp.,
312 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (Lanham Act § 43 (a) also cited).
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (Supp. I, 1971). The companion section, § 1338(b), pro-
vides for "pendent" jurisdiction over related nonfederal claims for unfair competition.
It reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting
a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trademark laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970). This subsection is often pleaded along with § 1338(a)
and Lanham Act §§ 39 and 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1125(a) (1970). See, e.g., Mortel-
lito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ; Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969) ; Zandelin v. Maxwell Bentley
Mfg. Co., 197 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
It has been held that § 1338(b), which was enacted after the Lanham Act, did not
supercede or nullify §§ 39 or 43 (a) of that Act in any way. Am. Rolex Watch Corp. v.
Jack Laufer & Jan Voort, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 858 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
43. This is because § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), is part of an act "relat-
ing to . . . trade-marks.' N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defendant photocopied plaintiff's sales catalogs and used them to ad-
vertise its own goods).
44. Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (common law
"certification" mark involved) ; N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (no trademark involved); General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp.,
259 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1966) (no trademark involved). Of course, jurisdiction may
be additionally based upon diversity of citizenship if the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
1332 (1970) are met. In practice this is done whenever possible. See, e.g., Bose Corp.
v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), modified, 467 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1972) ; Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
However, the only real advantage to pleading diversity jurisdiction would be to
sustain federal jurisdiction in a case that failed to successfully state a federal substantive
claim, but might be maintainable on state law grounds. In the absence of diversity juris-
diction, a case based on Lanham Act § 39, 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1970) and 28 id. §§ 1338(a),
(b) will be dismissed in its entirety if all of the federal claims fail to survive a motion
to dismiss. Idings v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967). But it should also
be noted that cases may also be brought in state courts by alleging § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a) (1970), as a substantive ground and referring to the nonexclusive character of
the federal jurisdiction conferring statutes. Section 39 of the Lanham Act does not indi-
cate that jurisdiction is exclusively vested in the federal courts. Moreover, 28 U.S.C. §
1338(a) (1970), which expressly provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction for copyright
and patent matters, does not do so with regard to trademark cases. For a state case de-
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Thus, various jurisdictional routes have been used in § 43(a)
cases. Since these routes clearly do not require any showing of diversity of
citizenship or minimum jurisdictional amount, access to the federal courts
is simplified and made more readily available in accordance with the
Lanham Act's express inftent. It is submitted that § 43(a) itself is not
really appropriate as a basis for federal jurisdiction because the con-
ferring of such jurisdiction is more obviously within the express scope of
§ 39 of the Lanham Act and § 1338(a) of the Judicial Code. However,
as the cases above indicate, no noticeable disadvantage attaches to claim-
ing alternative forms of jurisdiction.
Standing To Sue
The text of § 43 (a) specifes two classes of "persons" who can bring
suit against an alleged violator:
[1] any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated
as that of origin or in the region in which said locality is
situated; [2] any person who believes that he is or is likely to
be damaged by the use of any such false description or repre-
sentation."
The first of these classes recalls the pre-Lanham cases that allowed trades-
men from a particular geographical area to band together to seek an in-
junction against a competitor's false use of a geographical designation. 6
This class has never posed a problem. Although the second class is poten-
tially much larger due to its open-ended language, the issue of standing47
under this section has only recently become controversial.
In early cases under § 43 (a), the plaintiffs were in direct competition
with the respective defendants, and no issue of standing as such was
considered." In 1959, however, it was held that a trade association that
cided under § 43(a) see Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 19 App. Div.
2d 600, 240 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1963), affd, 14 N.Y.2d 498, 197 N.E.2d 610, 248 N.Y.S.2d
223 (1964).
Regardless of whether a state or a federal court decides issues under the Lanham
Act, it is federal substantive law that must be used. Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette Co., 389 F.2d
264, 268 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Brown & Bigelow v. Remembrance Advertising Prods., Inc.,
279 App. Div. 410, 110 N.Y.S.2d 441, 444 (1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y. 909, 110 N.E.2d 736
(1953) ; 2 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 93.1(b).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
46. See note 13 supra.
47. The term "standing" is being used in a statutory, but nonconstitutional sense.
See 72 COLUm. L. REV. 182, 182 n.5 (1972); 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN LJ. 583, 586 n.16
(1972).
48. See, e.g., L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir.
1954); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C.), af'd sub. nor. S.C. John-
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had a direct pecuniary interest in the sales of its members could sue under
§ 43(a), thereby extending that section's protection to commercial
interests in the nature of competition." This extension was allowed on
a theory that the plaintiff was a "person. .. damaged" by the defend-
ant's acts." The year 1959 also marked52 the first limitation on the
scope of the standing provisions of § 4 3 (a) when a case was dismissed
because the plaintiff, who had not yet marketed his goods in competition
with the defendant, was not actually "engaged in . . . commerce" with-
in the meaning of the relevant portion of the "intent" paragraph of the
Lanham Act. 3 This was the state of the law until 1971.
In 1971 the standing issue arose four times. In one case, the State
of Florida tried to use § 43(a) to enjoin defendant's unauthorized use
of a so-called "common law certification mark" 4 ("Sunshine Tree" for
cirtrus products)." Although Florida was neither a competitor nor a
party with a direct pecuniary interest in the business of a competitor, the
court allowed the suit, reasoning that
any proprietary right to the good will associated with 'Sun-
shine Tree' would be owned by plaintiff for use in connection
with any citrus products it desired. 6
In this manner it tacitly found a quasi-pecuniary interest which was suf-
ficient to meet the "person . . . damaged" test.
The other three cases involved the issue of consumer standing under
son & Son v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956).
49. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 161-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
50. This extension has been continued in recent cases which have allowed importers
of goods to sue under § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), to protect their interests.
See Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1972) ; D & M
Antique Import Corp. v. Royal Saxe Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1261, 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
52. Marshall v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 828, 834 (D. Md. 1959).
53. "The intent of this act is to regulate commerce within the control of Congress
. . . to protect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition." Lanham
Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). The phrase excerpted is the only one in the intent
paragraph that does not expressly refer to the use of "marks," and thus is the only
phrase applicable to violations of § 43(a), id. § 1125(a), not involving "marks."
54. The court used the term "certification mark" as it is defined in the Lanham Act:
The term "certification mark" means a mark used upon or in connection with
the products or services of one or more persons other than the owner of the
mark to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, quality,
accuracy or other characteristics of such goods or services or that the work or
labor on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other
organization.
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
55. Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
56. Id. at 432.
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§ 4 3 (a). In Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc.,7 an inventor
brought a class action on behalf of himself and other inventors similarly
situated against a "patent service" for allegedly false statements about
the nature of its business. In rejecting the defendant's argument that con-
sumers lacked standing because they were not engaged in commerce, the
court stated:
The liability clause of Section 4 3 (a) is clear on its face; it ap-
plies to any person who is or is likely to be damaged.
[Tihe plain language of the intent section [Lanham Act §
45, f[ 21] makes actionable, inter alia, the deceptive and mis-
leading use of marks and descriptions.5"
The Arnesen court further explained that "there is, absent legislative
intent to the contrary, no reason why [a consumer] should not be able
to sue for his own protection."5 9
In contrast to the Arnesen case are Florida ex rel. Broward
County v. Eli Lilly & Co."0 and Colligan v. Activities Club of New York
Ltd.,6 both of which prohibited consumers from maintaining actions
under § 43(a). In Eli Lilly, the State of Florida, acting through a
special assistant attorney general, sued on its own behalf and on be-
half of a class of consumers, alleging false representations about the
effectiveness and side effects of certain drugs manufactured by defendant
pharmaceutical firm. In dismissing the complaint, the court said:
The purpose, the legislative history, and the consistent line of
authority restricting the scope of Section 43 (a) . . . to actions
involving competitive injury suffered from "unfair competi-
tion" clearly indicate that the claims stated in the complaint do
not arise under the statute.62
This, of course, was in direct opposition to the holding in Arnesen
Unfortunately, the Eli Lilly court did not provide a satisfactory analysis
for this conclusion.
57. 333 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
58. Id. at 120. The court also approved a statement in Yameta v. Capitol Records,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 586 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated, 393 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1968), to the effect
that the Lanham Act's legislative history indicates that both competitors and consumers
were to be protected. Because of the Second Circuit decision, however, this authority is
very much in question. See note 176 infra & text accompanying.
59. 333 F. Supp. at 120.
60. 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
61. 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), noted ins 72 CoLum.
L. REv. 182 (1972) ; 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 807 (1971) ; 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 583 (1972).
62. 329 F. Supp. at 366-67.
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In Colligan, the Second Circuit provided the only painstaking
judicial treatment of § 4 3(a) consumer standing to date. Here, two
students brought suit individually and as members of two classes of stu-
dents who allegedly had been damaged or were likely to be damaged by
defendant's use of "false descriptions and representations of the nature,
sponsorship, and licensing of their interstate ski tour service."" The
court held that although the plaintiffs satisfied the literal requirements
of § 43 (a) and even though the legislative history was inconclusive,
standing was lacking because the congressional statement of intent in
§ 45' 4 limits the scope of § 43 (a) to "persons engaged in . . com-
merce against unfair competition."65 Thus, the court concluded:
[C]ongress' purpose . . . was to create a special and limited
unfair competition remedy, virtually without regard for the
interests of consumers generally and almost certainly without
any consideration of consumer rights of action in particular.6
The Colligan court buttressed its decision by referring to a passage
in the L'Aiglon case that suggested § 43(a) actions were only available
to commercial plaintiffs, and by raising the speoter of "a veritable flood
of claims brought in already overtaxed federal district courts."67 The
Court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that in the absence of clearly ex-
pressed congressional intent standing should exist for consumers in ad-
dition to commercial' parties." This holding is especially significant
coming, as it does, from the Second Circuit, long a leader in matters
relating to unfair trade practices. Whether other courts will follow its
views or will prefer the more expansive interpretation of standing of the
Arnesen case remains to be seen.
Requirements of a § 43 (a) Case
One commentator has concluded that there are four requirements
63. 442 F.2d at 687 (quoting from the plaintiff's complaint). Defendant had
promised an all inclusive, high quality ski trip but had in fact provided a combination of
calamity and confusion ranging from an inadequate supply of ski gear to unlicensed
busses with faulty brakes, seeping exhaust fumes, and an intoxicated driver. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
65. 442 F.2d at 691.
66. Id. at 692.
67. Id. at 693.
68. Our analysis requires that the manner in which this issue be posed is pre-
cisely the reverse [of plaintiffs]: had Congress contemplated so revolutionary
a departure implicit in [plaintiff's] claims, its intention could and would have
been clearly expressed.
Id. at 693-94. This, of course, is directly contrary to the view espoused in Artesen. See
note 59 supra & text accompanying.
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for a successful action under § 4 3 (a) :
1. that the defendant's advertisement is in fact false;
2. that it actually deceives or has the tendency to deceive a
substantial segment of its audience;
3. that such deception is material, in the sense that it is likely
to make a difference in the purchasing decision;
4. that the particular plaintiff has been or is likely to be in-
jured as the result of the foregoing, either by direct diver-
sion of sales from himself to the falsely advertising competi-
tor, or by lessening of the good will which his own product
enjoys with the buying public. 9
Since 1956, these elements have been cited with approval by other com-
mentators."0 Indeed, with some modifications and a few additions, these
requirements remain accurate at the present time. However, a deeper
analysis of the content of these requirements is necessary.
The requirement of falsity is found in the language of § 43(a)
itself which directly proscribes
a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending
71,falsely to describe or represent the same... .
At least two reported cases have construed truthfulness as a complete de-
fense to a § 43 (a) clalm.7 ' However, "literal" truth is probably not a
defense. A false impression may be found to violate the section," a
69. Weil, Protectibility of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertis-
ing, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 527, 537 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Weil].
70. See, e.g., Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practice Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485, 489 (1967) ; Derenberg, First Decade, supra note
3, at 1053; cf. Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 616-17.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
72. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); Societe Comptoir de
L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962). In both of these cases, the defendants had accurately represented
that their products were copies of plaintiffs' goods.
73. Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Muta-
tion Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
But see Marshall v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 828 (D. Md. 1959). It is
quite important that false impressions are held to violate § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a)
(1970), because they are involved in so much of modern advertising:
[Modern advertising personnel] carefully choose words to create impressions
and expectations on the part of the consumer which are at least in part discrep-
ant with the product's true characteristics. [They] create an image of the
product in the consumer's mind that is not totally substantiated by the product's
true performance. . . . [T]oday's copy writers avoid clearly false statements.
They tend instead to use "those less obvious forms of falsehood which in causitry
and law are called suppressio verdi and suggestio falsi, concealing a truth and
SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
result which is entirely in keeping with the statutory phrase "words or
other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent."'"
The required falsity must pertain to a "designation of origin" or a
"description or representation."7  However, the phrase "designation
of origin" has been expansively construed to include indications of source
of manufacture, sponsorship, etc. in addition to indications of geographi-
cal origin,"' even though a literal reading of § 43 (a) would seem to lead
to a contrary result."
Another aspect of importance is the form which the false state-
ment"8 must take in order to constitute a violation of § 4 3 (a). The
statute does not mention the word "advertisement" nor does it indicate
that any specific form is or is not included. Instead, the statute broadly
applies to false statements that "[a]ny person . . . shall affix, apply,
or annex, or use in connection with goods or services, or any container or
containers for goods."7 The "affix, apply or annex" language would
adequately explain cases that consider false labeling within the scope of
§ 43 (a) ;"0 the "use in connection with goods or services" phrase would
hinting a lie, methods which certain types of advertising have carried to pitch of
skill and success that leaves us breathless."
Pollay, Deceptive Advertising and Consumer Behavior: A Case for Legislative and Judi-
cial Reform, 17 KAI,. L. Rnv. 625, 626 (1969), quotihg D. MAsTERs, THE INTELLIGENT
BuYmR's GuiDE To SEI.m.s 171 (1965).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) (emphasis added). Such a result is also consistent
with analogous decisions under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See P. Lorillard
Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950); 1 CAMIMANN, supra note 15, § 19.2(b) (1), at
667-68.
75. See Am. Optical Co. v. Rayex Corp., 291 F. Supp. 502, 510 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(dictum), aff'd per curiam, 394 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1968) ; General Pool Corp. v. Hall-
mark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1966). One commentator opined
that "all practices which would constitute a 'false designation of origin' would also
amount to a 'false representation' within the meaning of the statute." Unfair Competi-
tion, supra note 25, at 616, n.96.
76. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963);
N. S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Geisel v.
Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (and cases cited therein).
But see Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956).
It may well be that if the plaintiff has acquired a common law trademark, the
defendant's use of that mark constitutes a false designation of origin within the
meaning of [§ 43(a)].
Id. at 147 (dictum).
77. For an analysis that reaches this contrary result see notes 162-72 infra & text
accompanying.
78. The term "statement" will be used to denote "designations oforigin," "descrip-
tions" and "representations" within the meaning of § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
79. Id.
80. See Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958);
Scotch Whiskey Ass~n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill. 1971);
Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Universal Relay Corp., 285 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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seem to be applicable where false advertising of some kind is involved.8"
The mere removal of a designation of origin, however, is not violative
of § 43(a)," although the substitution of a false designation of origin
in place of the true designation might amount to a violation. 3 Under
this analysis, one could remove a trademark from another's goods and
sell them unmarked with impunity, but could not relabel the goods as
one's own. 4
Under § 43(a) the false designation, description or representation
must relate to the source, 5 nature 6 or quality 7 of "goods or services"
which "[a] ny person . . . shall cause . . . to enter into commerce.""
Cases construing the word "goods" have either read it very broadly or
have found that a "use in connection with . . . goods" was involved. 9
The term "services" has not caused any difficulty to the few courts that
have encountered it."0 There is authority, however, for limiting action-
able misstatements to those that a defendant makes about his own goods
or services," thus excluding statements he may have made about the
plaintiff's goods, which he did not "cause . . . to enter into commerce"
within the meaning of § 43 (a).
81. See, e.g., L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir.
1954); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill.
1965); Marshall v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 170 F. Supp. 828 (D. Md. 1959).
See also Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
which stated:
It would seem that a false representation contained in a report, brochure or
film prepared for selling purposes is as much a representation used "in connec-
tion with" goods as a representation in an advertisement.
Id. at 903; cf. Midwest Packaging Materials Co. v. Midwest Packaging Corp., 312 F.
Supp. 134 (S.D. Iowa 1970), where the court held that "stock certificates can be thought
of as 'use[d] in connection with . . . goods or services.'" Id. at 136.
82. "[Section 43(a)] makes actionable the applicationt of 'a false designation of
origin,' not the removal of a true designation." Pic Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision
Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (emphasis in original).
83. Id. (dictum).
84. Cf. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 600, 240
N.Y.S.2d 624 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 498, 197 N.E.2d 620, 248 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1964).
For a further discussion of the application of § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970), to
designations of source of manufacture see notes 162-72 infra & text accompanying.
85. See notes 75-77 supra & text accompanying.
86. See Potato Chip Institute v. General Mills, Inc., 461 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972)
Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116, 120 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
87. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill.
1971); H. A. Friend & Co. v. Friend & Co., 276 F. Supp. 707, 715 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd, 416 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1969).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
89. N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(sales catalogs) ; Midwest Packaging Materials Co. v. Midwest Packaging Corp., 312
F. Supp. 134, 136 (S.D. Iowa 1970) (stock certificates).
90. See Arnesen v. Raymond Lee Organization, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 116 (C.D. Cal.
1971) ; Harrison Services, Inc. v. Margino, 291 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
91. Bernard Food Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279, 1283 (7th Cir.
1969) ; Holsten Import Corp. v. Rheingold Corp., 285 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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As a result of the above interpretations it might be worthwhile to
revise the falsity requirement to read as follows:
The defendant's statement must either be false in fact or tend
to create a false impression about the geographical origin, source
of supply or sponsorship, or nature or quality of defendant's
own goods or services, and defendant must have attached
the statement to his goods or used it in connection with his
goods or services, which were in interstate commerce.
The second requirement is that the defendant's statement actually
deceives or has the tendency to deceive a substantial portion of its audi-
ence. Post-1956 cases have proven the accuracy of this requirement.
For example, in a case in which the Girl Scouts sued to enjoin the sale of
posters picturing an obviously pregnant girl in the well-known Girl Scout
uniform above the equally well-known motto "Be Prepared," the court
dismissed a § 43 (a) action on the ground that the Girl Scouts had failed
to "demonstrate that the false representations, if any, have a tendency to
deceive."92 Other cases also make it evident that deception is an integral
part of a claim under § 4 3 (a)."
The second requirement is closely related to the third, i.e., that the
deception is material, in the sense that it is likely to make a difference in
the purchasing decision. Materiality appears to be important in two re-
spects: first, to exclude de minimis violations arrd second, to make cer-
tain that the falsity of defendant's statement is measured against the type
of persons who received the statement. The first point is self-evident."'
92. Girl Scouts of the United States of America v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co.,
304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; cf. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking
Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958). "[T]here seems to be no requirement that purchasers
actually be deceived, but only that the false advertisements have a tendency to deceive."
Id. at 649.
93. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965);
cf. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Chandris America Lines,
Inc., 321 F. Supp. 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). "[A]lthough intentional falsification of the
designation of origin is not required, there must be some showing that the public might
be deceived." Id. at 712.
94. One court stated:
[Plaintiff] has not established that as a competitor it is or is likely to be dam-
aged by any false description or representation. It has not shown damage or
likelihood of damage due to the fact that any substantial number of reasonable
customers were misled or likely to be misled as to the nature of the product...
or that if they had known the true facts, they most likely would have pur-
chased a different product ...
Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829
(1956). Although this decision preceded the Weil article, Weil, supra note 69, it has
never been contradicted, and thus Mr. Wveil's materiality requirement would appear in-
tact. Cf. Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
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As to the second point, a court has taken specific notice of the nature of
the group that received defendant's statement. Because this court found
that the plaintiffs, a group of businessmen, were sophisticated in matters
of the sort involved, it held that materiality was absent."
The fourth requirement involves injury to the plaintiff. That actual
or potential injury is a requirement of a § 43 (a) suit does not seem sub-
ject to doubt,96 even though the statute itself, literally read, would allow
suit "by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that
of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated." 7 It is also
quite clear that while a showing of potential injury is sufficient for in-
junctive relief, a showing of actual injury is required for monetary re-
lief.9" However, there is considerable doubt as to whether the injury,
actual or potential, must be to commercial interests. Thus, the fourth
requirement must be modified to include the possibility of consumer suits
of the type discussed above.9
Type of Cases That Cone Within § 43(a)
Although § 43(a) has been construed in a manner prohibiting a
variety of false statements, the facts of L'Aiglon Apparel, lIc. v. Lana
Lobell, Inc.,' in which the defendant used a photograph of the plain-
tiff's product to advertise his own inferior product, still arise most fre-
quently."' Similar cases in which a defendant has used copies of his com-
where the court dismissed a § 43 (a) claim partially because defendant's statements "are
trivial and . . . do not add up to the kind of misrepresentation which I believe the Lan-
ham Act was intended to cover." Id. at 904.
95. Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In this case the "misrepresentations" were contained in reports, brochures, and films
circulated amongst businesses and persons involved in the advertising profession.
96. See cases cited notes 127-28 infra.
97. No cases have been found which give a literal interpretation to this phrase. But
Callmann states:
Indeed, the statute goes further in recognizing that the plaintiff need not even
be "in the same line of business and in competition with defendant"; it will be
sufficient, in the case of a false designation of origin, that the plaintiff is "doing
business in the locality falsely indicated" . . . .
1 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 18.2(b) (2), at 625. However, Mr. Callmann fails to indi-
cate the source of his quoted phrase "in the same line of business," and it does not
appear in the statute.
98. See notes 127-30 infra & text accompanying.
99. See notes 62-83 supra & text accompanying. See also notes 149-61 inlfra & text
accompanying.
100. 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). See also notes 19-23 supra & text accompanying.
101. See, e.g., General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp 383 (N.D.
Ill. 1966); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu, Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Am.
Optical Co. v. Rayex Corp., 266 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); of. George O'Day As-
sociates, Inc. v. Talman Corp., 206 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D.R.I.), aff'd sub norn. O'Day
Corp. v. Talman Corp., 310 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1962).
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petitor's sales catalogs. 2 or brochures0 3 have also come under § 43(a),
as do cases where the defendant actually used some of plaintiff's goods as
"samples" of his own goods.0 Ordinary passing-off has also been said
to violate § 4 3 (a),15 as has the use of deceptively similar trade dress.0 6
Likewise, false representations concerning approval or authorization of
defendant's goods or services violate § 43 (a).1°7 In addition, it has been
held that "slavish copying" of a competitor's goods violates § 4 3 (a), °108
but this would no longer appear to be good law since the landmark pre-
emption decisions by the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.' and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc."'
There is a group of § 43 (a) cases involving falsities concerning the
use of trademarks,"' service marks" 2 and "certification" marks." 8 Indeed,
it has been said as recently as 1970 that § 43 (a) applies only to deceptive
uses of common law trademarks "and similar misleading use of words,
names, symbols or devices adopted by a merchant to identify his goods."" 4
102. N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
103. Bogene Inc. v. Whet-Mor Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
104. Crossbow, Inc. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 335, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) ; Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Emenee Industries, Inc., 19 App. Div. 2d 600, 240
N.Y.S.2d 624 (1963), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 498, 197 N.E.2d 620, 248 N.Y.S.2d 223 (1964).
This behavior is sometimes referred to as "reverse passing-off," since it is the reverse
of the usual practice of passing-off one's goods as those of a competitor. Of course the
reason that this is done is to pave the way for later acts of ordinary passing-off.
105. Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. 1972);
Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 186 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1951) (and cases
cited therein).
106. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Fotomat Corp., 317 F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ga. 1969)
(defendant ordered to mark its film kiosks so as not to imply that they were operated
by plaintiff). See also Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304 (2d Cir.
1972).
107. Parkway Baking Co. v. Friehofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1958)
(existence of trademark license misrepresented) ; Jaeger v. Am. Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330
F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (defendant marketed a substantially modified version of
plaintiff's movie film representing that plaintiff was the "director" and "co-author");
Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (misrepresentation
that cartoonist who had created certain characters had designed or in some way ap-
proved dolls based on his cartoons).
108. Catalina, Inc. v. Gem Swimwear, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
see Unfair Competition, supra note 23, at 620-21.
109. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
110. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
111. Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v. Lander Co., 455 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1972);
Cutler-Hammer, Inc. v. Standard Relay Corp., 328 F. Supp. 868, 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
4j'd, 444 F.2d 1092 (2d Cir. 1971). But see McTavish Bob Oil Co. v. Disco Oil Co.,
345 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The court there stated that "the case law is not at
all clear as to whether § 43(a) applies to the use by a defendant of a plaintiff's alleged
common law trademark." Id. at 1381.
112. Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Burger King, Inc. v.
Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
113. Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428, 431 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
114. Sterling Prods. Co. v. Crest Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 204, 211 (E.D. Mich.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
However, this odd throwback to an early decision severely limiting §
43(a)". cannot be taken seriously due to those cases that expressly hold
to the contrary"' and the many cases that have applied § 43(a) in the
absence of any trademark or trademark-like infraction. 17
Case law does not limit the application of § 4 3 (a) to federally
registered marks; "common law" marks are also included."' However,
it is generally held that § 43 (a) will protect unregistered marks which
are not inherently "distinctive" in the trademark sense"9 only if they have
attained "secondary meaning," ' that is, if they have attained distinctive-
ness as indications of source of manufacture.' 2 ' The rationale behind
1970); accord, Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1966);
cf. Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The
Mortellito court stated:
The gist of the action under [§ 43(a)] is a use of the mark of tradename in
interstate commerce which is likely to cause confusion or to deceive purchasers
as to the source of origin of the goods.
Id. at 1294.
115. Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Mass.
1949), aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
116. Glenn v. Advertising Publications, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 889, 902 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) ; Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 310 (N.D.
Ill. 1965).
117. See notes 100-05 supra.
118. Bose Corp. v. Linear Design Labs, Inc., 467 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1972)
(trade dress); Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144, 147 (2d
Cir. 1956) (trademark) ; Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 428, 431 (M.D. Fla.
1971) (certification mark) ; Iding v. Anaston, 266 F. Supp. 1015, 1017-18 (N.D. Ill.
1967) (service mark).
119. With regard to the term "inherently distinctive" see 1 McCARTHy, supra note
15, §§ 11:2- :4. See also 3 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 66.1; E. VANDENBURGH, TRADE-
MARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 4.10 (2d ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as VANDENBURGH].
120. Joshua Meier Co. v. Albany Novelty Mfg. Co., 236 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1956);
N.S. Meyer, Inc. v. Ira Green, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Sterling
Prods. Co. v. Crest Mfg. Co., 314 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
In Joshua Meier, the court concluded that § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
would apply to unregistered trademarks only if they
are so associated with [plaintiff's] goods that the use of the same or similar
marks by another company constitutes a representation that its goods come
from the same source.
236 F.2d at 147; cf. California Apparel Creators v. Weider of California, Inc., 162 F.2d
893 (2d Cir. 1947). In that case Judge Clark stated: "[T]here is of course the neces-
sity of proving that the apparel labels do designate the origin of the goods to the buyers."
Id. at 901 n.12 (dictum).
The Sterling Prods. case is also noteworthy in holding that § 43(a) would not be
violated
unless [plaintiff's] claimed designations had acquired, in the mind of the average
purchaser, an association with [plaintiff] which indicated to said purchasers that
the product bearing these designations on its label . . . originated with [plain-
tiff].
314 F. Supp. at 211.
121. This, of course, is consistent with general principles of trademark law. See 3
CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 77; MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 15:1-:9; VANDENBURGH,
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this interpretation is the need to bring the case within the § 43(a)
phrase "false designation of origin, or . . . false description or repre-
sentation."'122 Unless the public has come to know a particular mark as
indicating a particular source of origin, a finding of the requisite falsity
would be anomalous since there would be no standard against which to
measure such falsity.
A few words should also be said about what acts do not violate §
43(a). It is abundantly clear that the utterance of wholly truthful, ac-
curate statements about one's own products--even that one's goods are
copies of another's "original" items-is not unlawful. 2 It has also been
held that § 43(a) has no application to actions for personal injuries
allegedly caused by reliance upon false representations. 4 Perhaps more
importantly, it has been held that § 4 3 (a) has no application whatso-
ever to acts of disparagement of another's goods."' This is apparently
based on the § 43(a) requirement that the false statement must be af-
fixed, applied, annexed or used in connection with goods or services
which the defendant "shall cause. . . to enter into commerce. 6
Remedies
As mentioned earlier, injunctive relief against a violation of §
43 (a) may be obtained on a mere showing of likelihood of injury to the
plaintiff,"27 but a monetary award can be recovered only where actual
supra note 119, § 4.70. However, proof of secondary meaning probably will not be re-
quired with regard to "inherently distinctive" marks, which is also consistent with gen-
eral principles of trademark law. See authorities cited note 119 supra.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
123. See note 72 supra.
124. Carpenter v. Erie R.R., 178 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1949). However, the importance
of this decision was later minimized by the same court. See Colligan v. Activities Club,
Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 688 n.7 (2d Cir. 1971).
125. Bernard Foods Industries, Inc. v. Dietene Co., 415 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1969),
where the court pointed out:
[T]he Act does not embrace misrepresentations about a competitor's product
but only false or deceitful representations which the manufacturer or merchant
makes about his own goods or services.
Id. at 1284 (emphasis added) ; accord, Holsten Import Corp. v. Rheingold Corp., 285 F.
Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; cf. Derenberg, First Decade, supra note 3, at 1055; Unfair
Competition, supra note 23. The latter wrote:
[T]hough trade disparagement would not fall directly within the statute [§
43 (a)], many such cases might be covered indirectly in so far as the acts com-
plained of also involved misrepresentations as to the defendant's product.
Id. at 620. But see Note, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Its Development and Poten-
tial, 3 LoYOLA U.L.J. 327, 337-39 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note].
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
127. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965) ;
Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1294 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1972);
General Pool Corp. v. Hallmark Pool Corp., 259 F. Supp. 383, 386 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
injury is proven."' This interpretation of § 43 (a), the text of which says
absolutely nothing about available remedies,129 is in accord with, and no
doubt modelled after, basic principles of remedies in trademark infringe-
ment and analogous unfair competition cases."' Furthermore, as in the
law of trademarks and unfair competition, 1' there is no requirement that
the defendant have an intent to deceive when the granting of an injunc-
tion is involved. 2 However, unlike trademark and unfair competition
law,"'2 intent is apparently unnecessary even when a monetary award
is sought.'2
The exact interaction between § 4 3 (a) and the remedies sections
of the Lanham Act'e" is unclear since each of these sections specifically
128. Hesmer Foods, Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965) ;
Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 302, 311 (N.D. Ill.
1965). See also Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nolrn S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956). The Gold Seal court said:
[Plaintiff's] attempt to analogize section 43(a) to a libel action, making proof
of actual damages unnecessary, is totally without support in law or reason.
Pecuniary recovery must be individualized, loss of sales must be shown. Sec-
tion 43(a) was to promote fair business dealings. It was not to provide a
windfall to an overly eager competitor.
Id. at 940. But see 1 CALLMAN, supra note 15, § 18.2(b) (2). Mr. Callmann stated that
proof of actual injury
should not be required when it is clear that false advertising was expressly
directed against the plaintiff. By analogy to the law of libel, the claim should
be actionable "per se," damage being the intended result of defendant's act.
Id.
129. The text of § 43(a) merely states that one who violates the proscriptions there-
in "shall be liable to a civil action." 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (a) (1970). For a full statement
of the text of § 43 (a) see note 1 supra.
130. See 4 CALLMANN, supra note 15, §§ 88-89; 2 McCARTHY, supra note 15, §§
27:5(A), 30; VANDENBURGH, supra note 119, §§ 5.20, 11.50. See also Hubbard, Mone-
tary Recovery Under the Copyright, Patent, and Trademark Acts, 58 TRADE-MARK, REP.
560, 583-92 (1968). See also Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court said:
We can . . . look to cases involving common law trademarks or those regis-
tered under the Lanham Act for help in defining notions such as 'confusing
similarity' or in specifying the degree of competitive advantage that warrants
relief.
Id. at 1294 n.8.
131. See 3 CAMMANN, supra note 15, § 86.1(a) ; 2 McCARTnY, supra note 15, §§
23:30- :32.
132. Apollo Distrib. Co. v. Apollo Imports, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 455, 458 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
133. 4 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 89.2(a); 2 McCARTHY, supra note 15, §
30:25 (A).
134. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3d Cir.
1958); Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub norn. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956).
135. The term "remedies sections" is used to refer to Lanham Act §§ 32-38, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114-20 (1970). Lanham Act § 39, id. § 1121, is treated only as a jurisdiction-
conferring section. See note 40 supra & text accompanying.
104
SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
refers to "registered mark" or some similar term,'86 whereas it is clear
that § 43 (a) applies to many cases not involving federally registered
trademarks.8 7  In fact most courts merely base injunctive relief on §
43(a) without any further explanation of the remedial authority.'
One court, however, has expressly relied on its general equity powers
in granting such relief.8 9 Yet, with regard to damage awards, 4 ' at least
two cases have indicated that § 35 of the Lanham Act, the monetary
award section, applies to § 43(a) cases.' 4 ' Moreover, it has been held
that damages may be awarded even though "the full measure . . . could
not be precisely shown" in a case where the violation was fraudulent and
the extent of the injury--especially to the future of the plaintiff's business
-could not be ascertained.4 2
There has been very little litigation concerning a plaintiff's right to
recover profits, costs and attorneys' fees under § 43(a).' So far no
reported case allowed such a recovery, but there has been a favorable
sign regarding profits4 4 and an unfavorable sign regarding attorneys'
fees.'
45
136. Lanham Act §§ 32, 33 and 37, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-15, 1119 (1970) (refer to
"registered mark") ; Lanham Act §§ 34-35, id. §§ 1116-17 (refer to "mark registered in
the Patent Office") ; Lanham Act § 36, id. § 1118 (refers to both terms) ; Lanham Act
§ 38, id. § 1120 (refers to "registration in the Patent Office of a mark").
137. See, e.g., cases cited notes 100-07 supra.
138. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill.
1971) ; Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 351-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) ; Burger
King, Inc. v. Brewer, 244 F. Supp. 293 (W.D. Tenn. 1965).
139. H. S. Friend & Co. v. Friend & Co., 276 F. Supp. 707, 716 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff'd, 416 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1969).
140. "Damages" may involve more than lost sales: injury to good will and the cost
of "abandoning a sales line" may also be included. 2 McCARTHY, sup-ra note 15, §
27:5(B), at 251, citing L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 115 U.S.P.Q. 235
(E.D. Pa. 1957).
141. Friend v. H. A. Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526, 534-35 (9th Cir. 1969). Gold
Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.), afj'd sub norn. S.C. Johnson & Son,
Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 829 (1956).
For the text of § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), see note 181 infra & text accompanying.
142. Friend v. H.A. Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1969).
143. "Profits" and "costs," but not attorney's fees are expressly authorized by §
35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), in cases of infringement of registered trademarks.
144. In Friend v. H.A. Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1969), the court implied
that profits could be granted under § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), when it denied a
recovery of such profits on the express ground that the lower court had already cor-
rectly "awarded damages for lost profits." 416 F.2d at 534-35.
145. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a disallowance of attorneys' fees based on the
federal cause of action under § 43(a), on the ground that the term "costs" in § 35, 15
U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), had previously been interpreted not to include such fees in Fleisch-
mann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Friend v. H.A.
Friend & Co., 416 F.2d 526, 534 (9th Cir. 1969). However, the court did allow a re-
covery of attorney's fees under the pendent state claim based on California law. Id. The
Second Circuit denied recovery based on a pendent state claim in Textron, Inc. v. Spi-
Dell Watch & Jewelry Co., 406 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1968).
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PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT EXPANSION OF § 4 3 (a): Too FAR,
MAYBE?
Although I have no major quarrel with the generally accepted view
that § 43(a) should be liberally construed so as to create a "federal
statutory tort, sui generis,"'" I do balk at the conclusion that it creates
"an affirmative code of business ethics whose standards can be main-
tained by anyone who is or may be dmnaged."' 47 The former statement
seems justified, considering the difficulty the common law encountered
in dealing with the problems of false advertising and Congress' dis-
satisfaction with the failure of its earlier attempt to ameliorate the prob-
lem. 4' The latter statement, however, seems overbroad and unwarranted
considering Congress' relatively narrow concern to upgrade the level of
competitive conduct by giving those engaged in commerce a feasible way
of combatting unfair competition in the form of false advertising and
labelling that tend to occur along with traditional trademark and passing-
off infractions. For that reason, I believe that: (1) private consumer
suits 9hould not be maintainable under § 43(a); (2) section 43(a)
should not be applied to typical trademark, trademark-like and passing-
off infractions; and (3) the remedies provided in the Lanham Act should
not be applied to violations of § 43 (a) simpliciter.
Private Consumer Suits Should Not Be Maintainable Under § 43(a)
In the recent Colligan case, 4 ' the Second Circuit construed § 43 (a)
in light of the legislative intent that could be gleaned from the language
of the Act itself and inferred from the common law underlying the Act,
rather than relying on legislative history that is "very long and con-
voluted.""'  It is submitted that this approach and the resulting con-
clusions were correct, even though the effect may have been to deny an
aggrieved party a feasible route to relief. 5'
146. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C.), af'd sub nor. S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 829 (1956).
147. Id.
148. See notes 9-15 supra & text accompanying.
149. Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971). See also notes 63-68 supra & text accompanying.
150. 442 F.2d at 689-90. The court pointed out that predecessor bills were intro-
duced as early as 1924, that at least fourteen sets of congressional hearings had been held
from 1925 to 1944, and that nine different committee reports were published. Id. 689-90
n.10.
151. Of course there are other remedies "available" under state law. See id. at 693
& n.35. To the extent that these remedies are not feasible in any particular case, a hard-
ship may be imposed on a genuinely injured party; but even so, this is not an adequate
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The Colligan court's analysis of the consumer standing problem had
three well-conceived parts. In the first of these parts the court correctly
recognized that the language of § 43 (a) itself, read literally, did not ap-
pear to "permit any other inference than that which [plaintiffs] would
have us draw-i.e., that 'any person' means exactly what it says."'5 2
However, in a footnote, the court made an important point:
[T]he key language in § 43(a) is not "any person" but any
person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation. The proper
focug therefore is whether [plaintiffs'] claims partake of the
nature of the injury sought to be prevented and/or remedied by
Congress through § 43 (a)."'
Thus, the court was saying that § 43 (a) had to be viewed in light of the
underlying congressional purpose, not merely as a statute in a vacuum.
In the second part of the court's analysis-subtitled "Legislative
History" various of plantiffs' arguments concerning statements made
by draftsmen, legislators and witnesses were considered to be so lengthy
and confused as to be inconclusive. This disposition was correct since the
evidence of legislative history favorable toward consumer standing was
very sketchy in general, and because some of it concerned statements made
over twenty years before the passage of the Lanham Act. 54 Moreover,
in the third part of the court's analysis,"' an even better reason for de-
reason to distort principles of federal law. After all, not every wrong realistically Has
a remedy:
An alleged violation of law is not everywhere and always a reason for judicial
intervention and judgment. Laws are a means to an end, not an end in them-
selves. The "majesty of the law" does not require that every alleged breach be
rectified.
Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARV. L. Rav. 633, 636-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe];
see Armstrong, Expressio Unius, Inchesio Alterius: The Fagot-Gomez Private Remedy
Doctrine, 5 GA. L. REv. 97, 116 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Armstrong]. See also 3
RuTGERs-CAMADEN L.J. 583, 590-91 (1972).
152. 442 F.2d at 689.
153. Id. at 689 n.8.
154. Id. at 689-91 & n.11.
155. This part begins with a one paragraph consideration of the plaintiffs' plea for
standing under Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970). However, the Second Circuit held: "Although the scope and effects of
Data Processing have not yet been clearly delimited, we hold that that case does not bring
these [plaintiffs] under its protective wing." Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F2d
686, 691 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). In Data Processing the Supreme
Court had held that a data processing firm did have standing to contest an administra-
tive regulation that permitted national banks to provide data processing services for their
banking clients. The Court established a two pronged test requiring allegations of "in-
jury in fact, economic or otherwise," and a claim that "the interest sought to be pro-
tected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." 397 U.S. at 152-53. This
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emphasizing legislative history was given: § 45 of the Lanham Act
contained an express congressional statement of intent "to protect persons
engaged in commerce against unfair competition."' 56 This clear language,
read in light of the common law problems that led to passage of § 43(a)'.
and the fact that consumerism had not yet come of age in 1946, led the
court to conclude that "[t]he Act's purpose, as defined by § 45, is ex-
clusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against
unscrupulous commercial conduct."'58
The upshot of the court's analysis is that § 43 (a) was intended by
Congress primarily to ameliorate competitive abuses and only incidentally
to benefit broader public or "consumer" interests. 9 This view is but-
test has been interpreted as placing increased reliance on "generally expressed legislative
policy" rather than on close literal analysis. Armstrong, supra note 151, at 102. Indeed,
it has been said that "the Supreme Court has gone very far toward eliminating standing
as a limitation on judicial review." Sedler, Standing, Justiciability, and All That: A
Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. Rlv. 479, 511 (1972).
Notwithstanding the above, it is submitted that Data Processing does not lead to con-
sumer standing in § 43 (a) cases. First of all, the Data Processing case, its companion
case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970), and other related, recent Supreme Court
cases-Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971) ; Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970)-all involved attacks
upon administrative action by a branch of the federal government. This is significant be-
cause considerations of standing in administrative actions differ from those applicable to
suits seeking nonadministrative relief. See 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 583, 590 & n.35
(1972); 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 807, 820 (1971). See also Jaffe, supra note 151; Scott,
Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 645 (1973).
Both Jaffe and Scott proceed on the tacit assumption that only administrative matters
are involved.
. Secondly, Data Processing also recognized that actual evidence of a legislative in-
tent against standing for a particular type of plaintiff would result in a finding of a lack
of standing. See Jaffe, supra note 151, at 634. Therefore, even if the rule of Data Pro-
cessing did extend to nonadministrative § 43 (a) cases, the legislative purpose for § 43 (a),
especially as expressly stated in § 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970), would
lead to a conclusion that consumers are not "arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected," and thus do not have standing.
156. 442 F.2d at 691. But see Note, supra note 125, at 342, where the author argues
that the consumer is "engaged in commerce" in the fullest sense of the term.
157. See notes 9-15 supra & text accompanying. In particular the Colligan court re-
lied on Judge Hastie's interpretation of § 43(a) in the L'Aiglon case:
This statutory tort bears closest resemblance to the * * * tort of false advertis-
ing to the detriment of a competitor, as formulated by the ALl (American Law
Institute) * * *," which tort makes clear that consumers must rely on other sec-
tions.
442 F.2d at 693 n.32, quoting L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649,
651 (3d Cir. 1954).
158. 442 F.2d at 692. It has been argued that "[tihe statement of purpose con-
tained in section 45 is counterbalanced by another statement of purpose contained in [a]
Senate report." 72 CoLuM. L. REv. 182, 186 (1972). But this argument seems to miss
the point that the language of the statute itself is far more authoritative than statements
of "legislative history."
159. See 3 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 583, 587 (1972) ; cf. 72 COLUm. L. REv. 182, 187
(1972). But see 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 807, 814 (1971), where the author cites various
authorities in support of his conclusion that § 43(a) was intended to prevent deception
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tressed by the fact that the law of unfair competition and trademarks in
general actually functions in this manner. Notwithstanding the oft-
expressed concern for public interest, the law's evolution has been restrict-
ed almost entirely to commercial plaintiffs. 6 ' Moreover, the Lanham
Act is generally quite respectful toward the common law of trademarks-
an addition rather than a contradiction. Therefore, in the absence of a
very clearly manifested legislative intent the stated purpose of the Act as
a whole should also apply to § 43 (a).'6
Section 43(a) Should Not Be Applied to Typical Trademark,
Trademark-Like and Passing-Off Infractions
As discussed above, § 43 (a) has been applied to practices which also
constitute trademark infringement (either at common law or under the
Lanham Act) and passing-off. This is because of the determination that
the phrase "designation of origin" in § 43(a) refers to the source of
manufacture in addition to geographical origin. In other words, false
designation of origin has been interpreted to mean false designation of
of the consuming public. However, most of the authorities relied upon are subject to
some doubt. For example, in footnote 52, WElL, supra note 69, at 536-37, is cited, but
when examined merely shows that Mr. Weil considered public deception an important
part of a § 43(a) case brought by a commercial plaintiff. Indeed, the entire article
assiomes that the plaintiff is a competitor.
It is significant that Professor Derenberg, probably the foremost authority in these
matters, has commented favorably on the Colligan case. Derenberg, 25th Year, supra
note 5, at 493-94. In addition, Mr. Callmann, another outstanding authority of some
vintage, anticipated Colligan when he wrote: "The public as such, i.e., the individual con-
sumer, will have no right of action under Section 43(a) and there is no need of such
right." 1 CALLMANx, supra note 15, § 18.2(b). In dissent, however, is Professor Mc-
Carthy, who argues, albeit with little reference to authorities, that Colligan is wrong and
that § 43(a) was intended as and should be treated as a consumer-oriented statute. 2
McCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 27:3-:4.
160. See generally 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, §§ 1:1, :4, :10, :12, 2:1-:4, :6-:7,
:10, :12-:14; 1 CALLMANN, supra note 15, § 3.4; 3 id. § 67. Professor Callmann summed
it up this way:
Practically speaking, public interest . . . has played a minor or supplementary
role at best. In no case has it been the decisive factor and its significance has
unfortunately been more ornamental than functional.
Id. § 3.4, at 96. A classic discussion of the competitor-consumer ambivalence of trade-
mark and unfair competition law appears in Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d
34, 37-43 (2d Cir. 1945) (Frank, J., concurring).
161. While it is true that Professor Dole, the main draftsman of the UNiFoRmx DE-
cEPTIvE TRADE PRAcrIcEs AcT, has concluded that the language of § 3 of that Act ("a
person likely to be damaged") should be construed so as to allow consumer suits even
though the Act may have been intended as a remedy for businessmen, it should be noted
that that Act does not contain a section like § 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127
(1970), that it was drafted in 1962 when consumer interests were more in the fore than
in 1946, and that the draftsmen directly considered consumer suits. See Dole, Consumer
Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DuKE L.J. 1101,
1106-07; Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49
BosT. UL. REv. 211, 243-44 (1969).
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manufacturer. However, a careful analysis of § 4 3 (a), along with
consideration of its purpose as viewed in the context of the Lanham Act,
leads to the conclusion that these applications are erroneous.
Section 43 (a) provides in part:
[Anyone who uses] a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation. . . shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as
that of origin or in the region in which said locality is situated,
or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representa-
tion.16
2
The linguistic parallelism of this excerpt should make it obvious that the
word "origin" in the phrase "designation of origin" should be read to
mean geographical origin and not origin of manufacture or sponsorship.
However, this view was expressly repudiated by the Sixth Circuit in
Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff,'63 despite a warning in
the district court's opinion that "nearly all the field of unfair competi-
tion" would be engulfed by § 43 (a).164 This fear may have materialized
since § 43 (a) appears to provide a way for any common law trademark
infringement or passing-off case affecting "commerce" to gain access to
the federal courts without meeting the requirements of diversity juris-
diction. Thus, designations of "origin" under § 4 3(a) have provided a
backdoor entry into federal courts for typical trademark and unfair com-
petition cases, even including those which do not involve a federal trade-
mark registration-a situation that only very doubtfully accords with the
congressional intent of § 43 (a).
Interestingly enough, reaction to the Azoff origin rule and its pro-
geny has been quite favorable. 6 The cases that have allowed § 43(a)
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
163. 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963). The court stated:
"We are further of the opinion that the word 'origin' in the Act does not merely
refer to geographical origin, but also to origin of source or manufacture." Id. at
408. The primary ground for the decision was a determination that by deliberately
copying plaintiff's distinctive trade dress, defendants "falsely represented that their bear-
ings and connecting rods were the product of [plaintiff] . . . [which acts] in our
opinion charge a false description or misrepresentation, as those terms are used in the
statute." Id. This is another way of getting at trademark and trademark-like infrac-
tions. Interestingly enough, however, no decision has adopted this portion of the Azoff
opinion, which involves a somewhat strained interpretation of the terms "description"
and "representation."
164. Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 201 F. Supp. 788, 789 (N.D.
Ohio 1962).
165. The rule has been approved by noted authorities. See, e.g., 1 CALLMANN, supra
note 15, § 18.2(b), at 623; 2 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 27:7, at 254; cf. RoB T,
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to apply to typical trademark and passing-off situations have exhibited
no concern about their interpretations; they merely cite Azoff and a case
or two in accord as authority for the rule and then proceed. "6 The only
noted commentator who seems at all concerned about these matters is
Professor Derenberg, who recently complained about the application of
§ 43 (a) "in a rather routine passing-off situation for which, in the
writer's opinion, the Section was hardly intended."' 6
Even so, it is submitted that Professor Derenberg's analysis is
correct. Section 43 (a) is just one of two isolated sections of a statute
that is devoted almost entirely to trademark protection,"8 and, unlike
almost every other section of the Lanham Act, it does not include the
word "mark." An interpretation that § 43(a) applies to basic trade-
mark infractions creates a question of the proper interaction between §
43(a) and the other, more clearly trademark-oriented sections of the
Act. The only point in favor of the Azoff rule is the language of § 45
which says that Congress was interested in '"making actionable the decep-
tive and misleading use of marks in . . . commerce."' 69 Unlike other
clauses of this paragraph, the word "mark" in this section is not modified
by the word "registered." This omission could be accidental, or it could
imply a concern for unregistered marks. The former interpretation seems
more reasonable since otherwise two clauses in this paragraph would
both apply to § 43(a), a section that admittedly is different from the
bulk of the Act. In addition, it would be odd to refer to § 4 3 (a) by
using terms (such as "deceptive and misleading") that are similar to
but not identical with the crucial terms in that section.
In sum, § 43 (a) appears to be a limited reaction to the ineffective-
ness of § 3 of the Trademark Act of 1920 and to the common law "single-
source" rule, rather than a statement of congressional desire to create a
panacea for all types of unfair competition affecting interstate commerce.
Under this view, § 43(a) would not apply to cases of mere passing-
off or infringement of registered or unregistered trademarks. However,
it could apply to those trademark infringement cases that involve a
"false descripton or representation," such as where the trademark itself
describes or represents a false characteristic of the goods or services to
supra note 16, at 187. But see id. at 119. Only one student writer has appeared disturbed
about the rule. 62 MIcH. L. REv. 1094, 1098-99 (1964).
166. See, e.g., cases cited notes 125-27 supra; Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc.,
335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
167. Derenberg, 25th Year, supra note 5, at 497.
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (1970) is directed toward trademark infringement and unfair
competition in intenzational trade.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
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which it relates, and to cases truly involving false designations of geo-
graphical origin. Thus, referring to imitation fur as "Normink"'17 might
be actionable because of the false description or representation that the
product contains mink, as would labelling whiskey made in Panama
"Scotch"'' because of the false geographical designation. On the other
hand, copying a competitor's trademark "Disco"' 2 for gasoline and re-
lated products would not be actionable. This interpretation, which ex-
cludes trademark infringement qua trademark infringement from the
purview of § 43(a), is more in keeping with the section's limited con-
gressional purpose.
The Remedies Provided in the Lanham Act Should Not
Be Applied to Violations of § 43(a) Simpliciter
As indicated above there is not much authority on the relationship
between § 43(a) and the remedies sections of the Lanham Act. The-
oretically, the remedies sections can be applied to the following situations:
(1) to violations of § 32 and all cases under § 43(a); (2) to violations
of § 32 and to cases under § 43 (a) involving federally registered marks;
(3) to § 32 violations only. It is submitted that the final possibility is
correct, that is, the Lanham Act does not provide any specific remedies
for violation of § 43 (a).
First, each of the remedies sections includes a direct reference to the
term "registered mark" or some similar term. 7 ' This clearly contrasts
with the text of § 4 3 (a) which makes no such reference and which has
been generally construed to apply regardless of a federal registration.""
Second, § 32... is the central remedial provision since it defines the
170. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n v. Lou Nierenberg Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); cf. Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.D.C.), aff'd . ub no n.
S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 829 (1956) ("Glass Wax" for a cleaner containing no wax).
171. Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ill.
1971) ; cf. California Apparel Creators v. Wieder of California, Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d
Cir. 1947).
172. McTavish Bob Oil Co. v. Disco Oil Co., 345 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
cf. Mortellito v. Nina of California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Nina"
for needlepoint kits) ; Apollo Distrib. Co. v. Apollo Imports, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Apollo" for radios and appliances).
173. See note 136 supra.
174. See cases cited note 118 sitpra.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970). Lanham Act § 33, id. § 1115, is directed entirely at
the evidentiary effect of a federal registration and thus has no connection whatsoever to
§ 43(a). Similarly, Lanham Act § 37, id. § 1119, and Lanham Act § 38, id. § 1120, in
referring to a court's power to rectify the federal registers and to a civil action for
fraudulent registration respectively, clearly have no relation to § 43(a). Likewise, Lan-
ham Act § 36, id. § 1118 which authorizes the destruction of infringing labels, fairly
obviously applies only to § 32, id. § 1114, since its language is significantly similar to that
of § 32 and its general thrust seems oriented toward traditional "infringements."
SECTION 43(a) OF THE LANHAM ACT
basic violation of "infringement." The basic rule is that anyone who uses
a confusingly similar trade designation "shall be liable to a civil action
by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided."' 6 The italicized
phrase once again contrasts with the text of § 43(a) which provides 'for
a "civil action" without any further reference to remedies. Moreover,
"infringement" under § 32 would cover only a small portion of recognizedi
§ 43 (a) situations, excluding many significant aspects of false advertis-
ing and labelling.' Thus its direct application to § 43 (a) cases is some-
what anomalous. Indeed, under the suggested view that § 4 3 (a) should
not apply to typical trademark infractions,' recourse to § 32 would be an
entirely separate basis for an action.
Section 34 is also of central importance because it authorizes injunc-
tive relief. In part, it provides:
The several courts vested with jurisdiction arising under this
act shall have power to grant injunctions, according to the
principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem
reasonable, to prevent the violation of any right of the regis-
trant of a mark registered in the Patent Office 79
Although this excerpt uses the broad phrase "violation of any right"-
which certainly is broad enough to encompass § 43(a)-a complete
reading shows that this phrase is qualified by "of the registrant of a mark
registered in the Patent Office," thereby once again suggesting it does
176. The entire first subsection of § 32 reads as follows:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or color-
able imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate a registered
mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imita-
tion to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertise-
ments intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services
on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided. Under subsection (b) hereof, the registrant shall not be entitled to
recover profits or damages unless the acts have been committed with knowledge
that such imitation is intended to be used to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1970).
177. For example, false statements about the nature or quality of one's goods or
services would not be included.
178. See notes 162-72 supra & text accompanying.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1970) (emphasis added).
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not apply to § 43(a).280
Perhaps the strongest evidence for concluding that § 43(a) stands
apart from the Lanham Act's remedy provisions can be found in § 35."'
This section conditions relief upon "infringement" under § 32 and satis-
faction of the notice requirements of § 29.18 The direct reference in §
35 to these other sections clearly indicates that these sections are separate
from § 43(a), especially since the notice requirement in particular is
flatly inconsistent with the applicability of § 43 (a) to cases not involving
a registered mark."'
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the remedies
sections of the Lanhaam Act should not apply to violations of § 43 (a).
However, since sections 34, 35, and 36 do refer to "violation[s] of any
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent Office," it is
possible-albeit unlikely-that these remedies would be available in §
43 (a) cases involving a false statement about a registered mark. This,
however, would be a strained and awkward reading of the statute; in fact,
180. In addition, another portion of § 34, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1970), sets forth
various duties of court clerks to notify the Commissioner of Patents about any litigation
concerning registered marks. This is another indication that § 34 does not apply to §
43(a) actions.
181. This section, another provision of central importance, reads as follows:
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the
Patent Office shall have been established in any civil action arising under this
Act, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 29 and
32 and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits,
(2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be as-
sessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to
prove defendant's sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or de-
duction claimed. In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, accord-
ing to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as
actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court shall find
that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or ex-
cessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court
shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in
either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.
15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970). This section provides in part:
[I]n any suit for infringement under this Act by . . . a registrant failing to
give [the proper statutory] notice of registration, no profits and no damages
shall be recovered under the provisions of the Act unless the defendant had
actual notice of the registration.
Id. Since § 29 expressly refers to "any suit for infringenent," id. § 1111 (emphasis
added), it could be argued that its notice requirement has no application to § 43(a) ac-
tions. This is a possible irlterpretation, but is less appealing than the conclusion (urged
in this article) that none of the Lanham Act's remedial provisions applies to § 43(a)
actions.
183. In other words, if § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970), is held to apply to § 43(a),
then no monetary relief would be recoverable for any violations of § 43(a) not involv-
ing a federal registration. This would be a very peculiar-and probably unintended-re-
sult indeed.
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such a reading is ruled out if the view that § 43 (a) does not apply to
typical trademark violations is correct.
If indeed § 43(a) stands alone and must fend for itself remedially,
then principles of federal' law would determine the appropriate remedies.
Therefore, those remedies that are available to a court of equity could be
employed, as is done in unfair competition cases not arising under the
Lanham Act."8 5 This would leave the courts with their usual powers to
grant injuctions and assess damages, profits and costs, but might deprive
them of the special flexibility of § 35 which expressly allows the court
to award amounts in addition to basic profits and damages, where, in its
discretion, and "according to the circumstances of the case," the basic
amounts are insufficient. 8 ' However, § 43 (a) plaintiffs may be able to
obtain attorneys' fees since it could be convincingly argued that the deci-
sion prohibiting such fees because of the wording of § 35 is inapplicable
to § 43 (a) cases."'
CONCLUSION
Section 43(a), a sleeper for the first ten years of its existence, has
become a viable weapon against false advertising in the 1970's. During
this development, the requirements of jurisdiction were relaxed; the class
of possible plaintiffs was expanded at least to include all commercial
parties affected by alleged violations; the types of situations to which §
43(a) applies were broadened; the requisites of § 43(a) lawsuits were
classified; and some indications of available remedies appeared. This con-
siderable growth leads to the conclusion that § 43 (a) has indeed "come
a long way."
Considerable question exists, however, whether § 43 (a) has already
outgrown its proper bounds in three specific areas-consumer standing,
184. See note 44 supra.
185. See 4 CALLMANN, supra note 15, §§ 87-89; 2 McCARTHaY, supra note 15, §§
30:1-:31; VANDENB Um, supra note 119, § 11.50.
186. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
187. Note the language that Chief Justice Warren used in disallowing attorneys'
fees in a Lanham Act infringentent case:
[I]n the Lanham Act, Congress meticulously detailed the remedies available to
a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed. . .. When
a cause of action has been created by a statute which expressly provides the
remedies for vindication of the cause, other remedies should not readily be
implied. . . We therefore must conclude that Congress intended § 35 of the
Lanham Act to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief
in cases arising under the Act.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Corp., 386 U.S. 714, 721 (1967) (em-
phasis added). Although the last sentence of this passage does include the phrase "cases
arising under the Act," the case itself involved infringement of a federally registered
mark and the language should not be read to extend to cases arising under § 43(a).
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use in trademark-related cases and the applicability of Lanham Act
remedies provisions to § 43 (a) cases. In these areas, § 43 (a) should be
read cautiously, with a view to its special common law background and
apparent legislative purpose, even though this may run counter to the
current rising tide of consumerism. We should forego instant con-
sumerism in favor of a more respectful interpretation of the intended
meaning of a congressional mandate. Already § 43(a) has come
somewhat "too far."
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